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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
Tlfl<: OIL SHALE CORPORATION, 
a :; enula Corporation, 
Pl ai11ti ff-A Ji pell ant, 
-I'S,-
I·'RED Y. LARSON, also known as \ 
F'JrnDr~RICK v. LARSON, 
~JTHEL B. LARSON, Husband and 
Wife; FREDERICK H. LARSON 
all(! DOROTHY H. LARSON, 
ff us band aml Wife. 
Def e ndants-Rcs zwnd ent s. 
Case 
No.10887 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
'l'he plaintiff-appellant respectfully petitions this 
1Io11orahl0 Court for rc>hearing in the above entitled case 
npon thL· following grounds: 
I. 'l'HI8 COURT'S DECISION OF MARCH 
6, 1 %8 IS ERRONEOUS BECAUSE: 
.1. Tl1is Court has based its decision on Find-
iJ1,r;s of Fact aml Conclusions of Law which 
had !Jec11 i-acatcd by the trial court and 
1lirl so at defendant's 11rgin9. 
1 
B. Defendants are precluded from contestinq 
the trial court's finding that there was a 
binding option contract because (1) de. 
fendants urged the trial court to rnah 
such a finding and (2) defendants liat·c 
not filed a cross-appeal asserting such 
finding as error. 
C. The trial court found, and wa.s correct i11 
finding, a binding option contract. 
II. THIS COURT HAS NOT DECIDED THE 
SOLE QUESTION ON APPEAL WHICH 
IS WHETHER AN UNAMBIGUOUS OP-
TION CONTRACT CAN BE VARIED BY 
P AROL EVIDENCE. 
VAN COTT BAGLEY, CORNWALl 
& McCARTHY 
CLIFFORD L. AsHTON 
How ARD L. EDw ARDS 
DoN \V. CROCKETT 
Attorneys for Appellant 
2 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
I. THIS COURT'S DECISION OF MARCH 
6, 1968 IS ERRONEOUS BECAUSE: 
A. This Court has based its decision on Find-
ings of Fact and Conclusions of Law which 
had been racated by the trial court and 
did so at defendant's urging. 
'l'liis cas0 is an appeal from a judgment of the trial 
c1mrt "·hich found that defendants, in consideration of 
the paym011t of $20,000 by plaintiff, had granted plain-
tiff au option of six months' duration to lease certain 
rni11i11g claims, ancl that the option, which commenced on 
.Tnly J.), 19nB, expired on January l.'i, 1964, without hav-
ing hceu exercised hy plaintiff. Amended Findings of 
Fart and Conelnsio11s of Law dated Fehruary 21, 1967, 
Hc<"onl, p. 92. 
Paragraph 3 of the amended Findings of Fact of 
r'rhrnary 21 reads: 
:-L On July 25, 1963, Plaintiff and Defendants 
sigm•tl a 10tter dated January 25, 1963, which in-
eorporated by reference a memorandum prepared 
h_\· Alhert F. Lenhart and is dated July 11, 1963. 
These two instruments constituted Plaintiff's Ex-
liibit 2, which was admitted in evidence. There 
\\·Pre also rertain oral understandings which sup-
plPnH·11ted Plaintiff's Exhibit 8 and which con-
~i~te<l of thP following: (a) The option to lease re-
3 
forre<l to iu Plaintiff\; Exhil>it 2 \ras to c·omrnu1ht 
011 .July 13, 196:3 arnl expire 011 .January l:i, l~J()t 
ff (b) Other provisions C'Ont<•mplated by the par-
ties as a part of their trausaction would he snl>~e­
quently negotiated and (c) FrNleriek H. Larson'., 
employment contract was to commence 011 Juh 
13, 1963. The parties' actions and con<lud RuJ;_ 
sequent to the execution of Plaintiff's Exhibit~ 
were in accord with and confhmed the aforemr·it 
tioued oral understandings. The 1iartics co11si1/_ 
ered the foregoi11g as creating au agrce1111'/1f /11._ 
tween them and acted accordingly. (Empha'i' 
supplied) 
Paragraph 3 of the Conclusious of La\r of Fehruan 
21 real ls: 
3. The option period expired 011 .Janna ry 1.i. 
196±. Therefore, Plaintiff now has no right, title. 
iuterest or claim iu nrnl to the Larson lands. 
In short, the trial court concludccl that tlwrc wa~ i11 
fact an euforceahle agret'ment, uot that it was fatally 
deficient. 
This Court appears to haw based its deci,;ion or 
;\larch 7, 1968, in part upou the premise that trial conrt 
found that the agreemeut of July 23, 1963, was "an 
agreement to agree" which was "not specifically en-
forceable." 
This was indeed the purport of the vacated Fimlingi 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law prepared hy the defend-
ants and erroneously entered by the trial court on Xo· 
vember 1, 1966. These Yacated Findings and Conch1sio11> 
recited in part : 
4 
:L Plaintiff's Exhibit 2, li;· itself or wh0n 1ornp-
plrmeut0il hy oral uml0rstnrnlings of the parties 
as e1111mPrnte><l in Paragraph 3 of the Findings of 
Fart 0ntered herein, c100s not constitute a com-
plrtP agre0m0nt between the parties which can be 
enforC'ecl or whirh the Court can order specifically 
performP<l. At best, the Plaintiff's E~xhibit No. 2 
cons tit ues only an expression of the parties' in-
tent ion to ent0r into suhsequent formal agree-
m1•uts, which formal agreements were coutemplat-
t·d to include the agreed understandings provided 
in Plaintiff's Exhibit 2. Since the parties by their 
O\rn admissions left certain essential matters to 
lie negotiated and subsequently included in for-
mal agreements, Plaintiff's Exhibit 2 constitutes 
mily an ngre0ment to agree and as such is unen-
forcea hle. 
Plaintiff moved for a new trial. At the heHring on 
t Iii~ motioll the court informed the defendants that the 
findings and conclusions entered on November 1, 1966, 
.Ji,] not reflect the theory on which the case had been 
d1·ridecl and entC'n·<l the Amended Findings of Fact and 
('onclusious of Law of February 21, 1967. (Tr. 2, p 37-42) 
It is obvious that this Court based its decision on 
tl1e Yacated findings because this Court said in part: 
.... the trial court found that the document, 
hy its terms, which plaintiff asked the court to 
construe, was not specifically enforceable. With 
this conclusion we agree ... 
The uovel and complicated course of events in the 
trial comt which resnlte>d in a record containing two sets 
of romplPtely contradictory findings and conclusions ap-
pan•n11;· mislecl this Court. 
This Court was further rni"k<l hy defendant's hrit{ 
On page 4 of defendant's briPf, lkfrndmits qnand witJ
1 
plai11tiff 's statement of the case hoping to lead this conr: 
to the belief that the trial court found the .July 2.j lcttei 
was not enforeea hie. 
The defendants' brief said in part : 
C. On the bottom of Page 6 and at the top 0\ 
Page 7 of its Brief, Tosco states: 'Thereupon a 
new letter agreement of July 25, 1963, 1chicl1 thl' 
Trial Court found binding on both parties, \\'a.-
drafted in Larson's presence.' (Emphasis sup 
plied.) This statement is 110t correct. A re\'iPw 
of the initial Findings of Faet and Conclusions ui 
Law entered by the Trial Court on Nm·ember 1, 
1966 and the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law as revised and entered hy the Court on ,Jm1-
nary 6, 1967, will conclusively show that the .Tnh 
Letter, in and by itself, was never considered a> 
being binding upon the parties by the Trial Court, 
or for that matter, by the parties themselws 
( 1'r-1, Pg. 115 L 20-28; Tr-1, Pg. 78, Y 16-23.\ 
Brief of Respondents, Page 4. 
This is followed by defendants' argument IA which 
devotes eleven and one-half pages to an issue not beforr· 
this Court - \Vhether the letter of .July 25, 1963 wa> 
specifically enforceable. It is little wonder that thi~ 
Court was uncertain about what the trial court really 
held. Where this Court has "misconstrued or overlooked 
some material fact or facts, or ... [has] either mistaken 
or overlooked something that materially affects the re-
sult," a rehearing is in order. Cummings v. Nielso11, 42 
Utah 157, 129 Pac. 619, 624 (1913), on petition for re-
hearing. 
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J'laintiff rE'srwctfully asks this Court upon rehearing 
111 in rnkc• thr well-known rules of appellate procedure 
,r!iich a re designed to prC'cl ude the capricious shifting of 
posit ion which has caused so much confusion both in this 
('on rt and in the trial court. These rules are set forth in 
tli<' a 1 guments which follow. 
B. Defendants are precluded from contesting 
the trial court's finding that there was a 
binding option contract because (1) de-
f Mulants urged the trial court to make 
such a finding and (2) defendants hat·e 
not filed a cross-ap7Jeal asserting such 
fi11di11,q as error. 
(1) lm:ited Error 
Prior to trial defendants amendE'd their answE'r to 
alleg(• a completed option contract which had expired on 
.Tiinuary 15, 1964: 
The Defe11dants ... admit that on July 25, 
10():1, tl1r Dcfomlants granted to the Plaintiff a 
six-month option relating to certain unpatented 
and patented mining claims owned or controlled 
h,,- th0 Defendants through Larson Oil Company. 
The pPriod of the option granted by the Defend-
ants nm from ,July 15, 1963 to January 15, 1964, 
at whirh timE' said option expired .... (Defend-
ant's Amended Answer, Paragraph I, Sub-para-
gTnpl1 2, RProl'Cl, p. 40.) 
,\ft0r plni11tiff had moYed for a new trial, defend-
ant~, i11 opposing plaintiff's motion, agnin urged thP 
1na1 ('Ollrt to co11dn<l0 that tlwre was a hinding optio11 
('r>ntrn('t. Tll(• following colloqu>- took placC' between th0 
I ri<tl 1·11 111·\ n11d ~r r. ,fr11scn, mw of drfendn11ts' attorC'n~-s: 
-
I 
Tim ( 'onff: I 1hi11k it is rather 1wculiar fo, 
yon peopk• to comp i11 a11d argm• tlwre wns 110 op. 
tiou whPn your client says tlwr0 was an op1io 11 
and tC'stified according]~., 
.:\In . .JENSEN: \Vell, if tlw court please wlH'n J 
am addressing mysplf to that, T 'm looking at tJ,i.' 
thing from the date of the docum0nts, a1Hl WP arf' 
talking now, ahont spPcific performance. 
THE CounT: If T cau 't rply upon the testimom 
of your client. · 
.\In . .JEN"SEX: Th0re is not m1y question aliou1 
it. 
THE Cornn: 'I'h0n thPn' on.ght to he a re1·iP\\ 
of my decision. 
" 
THE Coewr: ]:..; the court justifiNl from the cri. 
deuce, rea<'hing the couclnsion that there was a11 
option hetwPen the parties which hega11 011 .Jnl> 
15th, and run to .January 15th'? If there wa' 
such a noption, did the plaintiff comply with the 
terms of it, exercise his option, if lH' did not, rLil 
he have an extension of time'? 
Now is the court justified in finding snch a11 
option f 
Mn . .JENSEN: ThP court is justifiPd i11 findin~ 
that the parties hoth operated on that propo:~i­
tion. 
THE Co·rnT: And the~· fail0c1 to Px0rcise their 
option'? 
?\In. .JENSEN : They failed to exercise witlii11 
the period of time, and failed to exercise it at all 
THE CounT: And the paying of the $20,~0() 
was justified, because that was tlw <'Onsi<lrratio11 
for the option? 
8 
\l i: .• h:.\"sEl": 'I'his is tnw. 
T11E ( 'ot"HT: Thr court 1s justifie<l 111 finding 
tliatt 
\Ii: . .JExsEx: Yes. 
Tm: ( 'ol'HT: Drws tlH' finding that the court 
mndP refle('t that condition"? 
~1 n . .J EXSEN : ~Ir. Ruland indicates to me that 
Jw <louhts if they do. 
THE CoFnT: Do you want to offer proposed 
modifications of the Findings·~ 
\In. HuLAXD: \Ve crrtainly do. 
:\In .• JE~sE&: \Ve certaillly do. 
( 'l'r-2, pp. 41-44) 
Tlwrenf11'J", dcfo11dants suhmitted and the trial court 
1•11h•red amended fimlings and conclusions of Fehruary 
~], 19GI, \\·hi('h found a hirnling contract between the 
JIHrtir~. 
011 tl1is appPal, the <lefrndants attacked the very find-
ings and ro11clusioJ1s which tlH'Y had prepared for the 
lrinl court, asserting that the option contract, which is 
t lw ha sis for those findi11gs, did not exist. Defendants' 
Brief, pp. 8-19. Under the cloctrinr of "invited error,'' 
\\ hif'h this Court has consiste11tl~, followed, defendants 
are preclude<1 from attacking on appeal the findings of 
Liet nnrl c011rlusioJ1s of law which they asked the trial 
1·onr1 to rntPr. Tn Pettingill Y. Perkins, 2 Utah 2d 266, 
~li0, 212 P.2d 183 (1934) this Court stated: 
H1wi11g by his own plradings, eYidence, and in-
st ruction tried and rested the case upon the 
thror~· that the mother's llegligence would bar the 
9 
father, he is bound thereby, as the law of thr 
case. He cannot now on appeal shift his thcon 
and position. · 
See also Ludlull' \', Colorado A11imal By-I'ror/ 11 , f, 
Co., 104 Utah 221, 137 P.2d 347 (1943); Eca11s v. 8ha11il, 
74 Utah 451, 280 Pac. 239 (1929); Obradovich v. Walker 
Bros. Bankers, 80 Utah 587, 16 P.2d 212 (19:32); All'arP: 
Y. Paulus, 8 Utah 2d 283, 333 P.2d 633, 635 (1939); M.01 111 
v. Fairbourn, 12 Utah 2d 342, 366 P.2d 603, 605 (19fil): 
Rohmfalk v. Vaughan, 89 Ariz. 33, 357 P.2d 617, G21 
(1960); 5 Am. Jur 2d "Appeal and ~rror," F16, pp. 
Hil-2. The general rule is stated in 5 C.J.S. "Ap1wal nnd 
Error," ~1503: 
The general rule is that a person cannot fry 
his rasp on onp theory in the trial court and 011 
another theory in a court of r0vie"'· \Vhether thr 
result in the trial court is in his fayor or against 
him and this is the rule both in hrw aml equity . 
. . . henee a party is estoppNl to urge on appeal or 
error any error growing out of the trial submi:;-
sion or f1ccision of the cause or of any questi011 
therein upon an incorrect theory 1che11 such theory 
1rns of his ow11 selPcfion or 1rlie11 such theory was 
adozJtPrl by the trial court at his req11Psf. 
\Vhen a party relies in the trial court 011 acer-
tain ground or theo1T of action or <ldcnse he j, 
hound thereby and will not be allowed in the ap-
pellate court 'to assume or adopt any position or 
attitrnlC' which is inconsistent therewith or to 
shift, ehang·C' or aharnlo11 his theory or conteutiom 
nor will lw lw ]1pard to qu<'sti011 th<> proprict~- or 
thc> nlli<lih· of l1is cotll'"C' i11 that hf•half nor may 
lit• c•1ilan1.!.(~· hi" tlll'on· of n•c·m·pr~-. Tlir rnlC' ap-
10 
plirs to a party who has tried his case wholly or 
in part on a certain theory. (Emphasis supplied) 
'I'he def Pndants asked the trial court to find a bind-
iug option contract between the parties. They cannot on 
1l1i~ ;ipp«al attack that finding. 
(2) Failure to Cross Appeal 
The Llefcndants <lid not cross-appeal from the 
.\mended .J udgmeut of the trial court. A respondent 
11lio has !lot eross-appealed is precluded from attacking 
tlw judgment of the lower court. This rule was stated 
by the U. S. Supreme C'onrt in LeTulle v. Schofiield, 308 
r.s . ..J-15, t!O S. Ct. 313 (Hl40) at p. 316: 
A respondent or an appellee may urge any 
matter appearing in the record in support of a 
judgment, but he may not attack it even on 
grounds asserted in the court below, in an effort 
to hav<> this Court reverse it when he himself has 
110t sought review of the whole judgment, or of 
that portion which is ach·erse to him. (Emphasis 
supplied) 
C. The trial rourt found, and was correct in 
fi11di11g, a binding option contract. 
(1) The agreement of .July 25, 1963, al-
though intended to be a preliminary 
agreement, was a complete and fully 
integrated writing which, when acted 
upon by the parties, became am en-
forceable agreement. 
The letter of July 25, 1963, was the rc>sult of extend-
i•d, prr!imi11ary negotiations which began in May, 1963. 
11 
It was iuten<lPd to, and <hd, i11corporatu nil of thP mati· 
rial pro,·isio11s nePded for the parties' attorney;.; to draft 
the> drtailed formal do<'uments which \\·Pre to follow. lt., 
terms are rn·rcise all([ dc>finitP. They define: (a) tl1e par-
ties ; ( h) the lands c·onn•d ; ( e) the option priC'e; ( d) t\ 11. 
consideration to be paid 011 exercise of the option; (c·) 
the delay rentals; (f) the royaltic•;.; to llC' pai<l i111hP 1·1p111 
of reduction; (g) tlw purchase price in the e\·ent the pm 
chase option is Pxercisecl; and (h) the procedures to li1· 
followc><l in ohtai11ing patents on the claims. It \Yill' d1• 
signed to guicle lawyers and othern in the lll'Pparation ol 
formal agreements. And it did in fact serYe this pur-
pose. Larson admitted that he :rnd his lawyer had hP1•11 
ahle to prepare drafts complete in eYery clf'tail. ][j, 
testimony rea<.ls: 
A. \\"" e had the .Jul~· 2;) lc>tt0r th0y werr goiuv 
on. l\fr. Dufford presenh>cl the completed leasr· 
with descriptions completrd in ew'ry cletail, rarly 
in Dect>mlwr. There \\'Olllcl haYe he0n 11lenty or 
time. 
Q. But actuall~- what was happening, yon wm· 
ha Ying exchange of agTerments, uncompleted ex-
change of agreements hetween two lawyers who 
were attempting to finalize what you agreed on: 
~\. That is not correet. These 1u'rr: comp/etnl 
a9rce111ents. (Emphasis supplied.) (Tr-1, PP 
41, 42) 
At a11other point Larson trstified that he ha(l threateue1l 
suit on this rery contract. ('fr-1, p. EIS) Larson's at· 
torney also recognized that there were no material omi'-
s10ns. He dc>scrilws the 011/y two areas of (liffereure hr-
tweeu his (lrnfts of Decc'mher 13 nrnl the .Jnl» 2:i, 1%:l 
12 
I,\ lc'r. a11<l <·011cludes that as to the;;e an•as of diffrrence 
tlir tPrms of the ldter of .July ~.") "·ould he eontrolling. 
11 l' ,;a id: 
\\'Ji~· C'ould they not lHwe said to Larson, as 
tlwy testified in the trial, 'Your drafts are just 
about substantially it, :·ou've got two things, one 
you said to do the patenting at our expense, and 
iliat is not what the letter says. 'l'his is clear, we 
know, \\·e decided that the patenting is going to 
he do11e liy us with your assistance at our expense. 
\Ye \·e got to change that around, because that 
,,.<' agree<l on, that is in the letter.' 
ThP second point. The Larson draft left an 
omission as to ,diat the amount of the purchase 
price <Jf tlw daims was to he, and the method of 
its payme11t, in the eYent that TOSCO elected 
sometime in the future to huy the property under 
tlw lease option. But, that \\·as also covered in 
the letter. TOSC'O could haYe said, 'Look, there 
1s a formula in the letter.' 
The·:· eould liaw said at that point,' Your draft 
is fiJ1c, 11·r hff1·r clia11gcd tliose t1co things, and ice 
are ready to 1·.rcrnte.' That ll'OUld hal'e created a 
re11l hi111li11g question lierr, there is no question 
11ho11f tliat at that pnhd, Larso11 ll'OUld hare had 
to say, "All right I a111 ready.' He said in his 
111('/llO wlie11 lie transfrrred tlie drafts, 'nr e are 
fl'ady to siqn.' (Emphasis supplied.) (Tr-3, pp. 
46, 47) 
lt i~ clenr that wheu Larson was pressing for money, he 
ilitl 11ot n•ganl the ldter of .Jnly 25, 1963, or the drafts 
that had been pr;,;pared pursuant to such agreement as 
ddieie11t in makrial terms. 
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There is no question but that a preliminary agrpe 
m0nt, 0\'en though contPmplating the C>xccution of m1 1r1 
formal documents, may be or become binding upon tJi1. 
parties thereto even though the more formal docume11 t~ 
arc newr prepared. Johnson v. Jones, 109 Utah 92, 164 
P.2d 893 (1946). See also, Cummings v. Niclso11, 42 FM 
157, 129 Pac. 619 (1913) reh. drn.; NielsoJ1 v. Rucker,~ 
Utah 2d 802, 3:i:i P.2cl 1067 (1959); Emrrma11 \', Balr/11111, 
186 Pa. Super. 561, 142 A.2(1 440 (1958); Smith v. 011111 
Oil & Chemical Co., 218 F.8d 104 (3rd Cir. 1955); 1 \Yil 
liston, Contracts (2cl ed. 1936), §§28, 28A; RPstatrme111, 
Contracts, §26. v\"11ere the parties el0ct to proceed i11 
accordance with tlw t0rms of a preliminary agreemPnt 
withont ex0cution of further contemplated \Hitings, thP) 
"·ill become bound to the terms contai11ed in the prelimi-
nary agT0ement. See, Cal11111Pf R!'fini119 Co. v. Star L1 
bri1·afi11q Co., (i4 Ptah 358, 230 Pac. 1028 (1924); Bradle·1 
v. Jfefropolita11 Jf11sic Co., 89 Minn. 516, % N.W . .J,,} 
(1903); American Arro Cor1Jornfio11 v. Gra11d ('f'11fra/ 
A ircraff Co., 1;;5 Cal. A pp. 2d 69, 31'i P.2(1 694 (195i): 
Corhin, Co11fra.cts, ~101; 29 Am.Jm.2(1, Crmfracfs, ~~R. 
p. :-366. 
Larson ask0d for pn~·ment, implicit!)· waiving exe-
cution of fi11al docum011ts. TOSCO complif·d with thi, 
request and paid the $20,000 c1u0 on commenccmr11t of 
the option. This conduct demonstrates that neither pai1: 
c011siderec1 the final execution of formal docume11b ii' 
a conditio11 pr0ced011t to performallre. RatlH•r they elect 
c•(l to proceed, co11fidellt of tlie turms in thP prelimi11an 
agTPPmen t. 
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(2) The omissions ichich have been cited by 
the Court as fatal are in fact either not 
supported by the euidence or legally im-
material. 
This Court found three areas in which the agree-
me11t of July 25, HJ6:3, was deficient: (a) it lacked pro-
1 i,;ions stating when the lease would begin or end; (b) 
1t (li.d uot state what type of conveyance would be used if 
tlH· option to purrhase were exercised; ( c) there was no 
11ru\ ision which estahlished the exact date when the six-
1 
mouth option to lease would commence; and ( d) this 
l'omt also found that one of the provisions of the agree-
mmt might offensive to the rule against perpetuities. 
(a) The option contract does not lack provisions 
:.;o,·erning the commencement or termination of the lease. 
l'laintiff respectfully disagrees that the agreement of 
Jnl~· 25, 196:3, does not provide when any lease to be 
acquired thereu11der would commence to run. It is pro-
1·illed that the lease would commence during the six-
mo11th option period at the time of the exercise of the 
optioll. 
Suhparagraph 2 of the agreement of July 23, 196:3, 
11ro1·irlt>s: 
By the end of the six month period, TOSCO 
11111st elect 1chether to lease the lands for oil shale 
mining ... If it elects to lease, it will at the time 
of the election deliver to Fred B. Larson and Eth-
e>] B. Larson, his wife, 2,500 shares of its author-
ized hut unissued common stock and simultaneous-
ly deliver to Frederick H. Larson and Dorothy 
H. Larson, his wife, 2,500 shares of its authorized 
but unissued common stock, . . . (Emphasis sup-
plied) 
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In this respect this transaction do<'s 11ot differ from 
other options to lease. Si1we the optio11 to lensL• mu~t Ii, 
exercised cl uring the term of t h0 opt ion and t li0 con~i,] 
eration for the leasr must he deliver0cl at the timf' of 
the exercise of the opio11, it must he }ll'PsnmPd that, nu 
less otherwise s1weified, the lease \\·oul(l eomm<'llC'P tql( 111 
the exereiS(' of the option. 
It is true that the agreement of Jul~· 2.), 19G.i, dol'., 
not specifieally proYidP for the termination of the lea~('. 
Ho\\·e,·er, thP absence of a specified termination date i11 
a mining lease is not fatal. D. A. C. ['ra11i11111 Co. v. R1·11 
to 11, 149 F.Supp. 6G7. In fact, the so-called "no term" 
lease has ht•comL' eommon. See, 3 A 111crica11 Law of Jfo_ 
i119, 0641: 2 811111111ers. Oil and Gas (Pf'l'm.Ed.), ~280. 
In the mineral law field, thL' lease for an i11defi11ilt· 
period is well recog11ized and is usually constrnCLl as n 
grant or a sale of the minerals in place, 3 A111rrica11 La11 
of Mi11i11g, ~1616, the mining lessee being Yested with a 
conditiomtl or cldPrmiuable fee. S111ith '°· Alrlrn Coal Cu., 
3-1-7 Pa. 290, 32 A.2d 227 (1943). 
If a lease pro,·idcs for a demise of a certain 
Yein, bed or lode within certain limits all(] con-
tains no limitations as to time it is limited onl: 
hY the exhaustion of the minPral. 58 C.J.S. Jlines 
a;ul ll1i11crals, ~171, 2 Snyder on l\fows, \12011 
(1902). 
Thus, alihough the option contract does not prorick 
for a spPcific (lay certain upo11 \\°l1irh the lease is to hr-
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~· 111 11r l1•nui11ate, the cYents whieh deh>rmine thP 1lura-
: 11,11 ,,[' tht> lPas<' arP clearly asrertainahlP. 
!h) Tlw failure of the July 25, 1963 agreement to 
, 1weify thr tn>e of document of ronveyance whirh was 
!fl iir' rrnplo)·cd if plaintiff exercised its option is legally 
imnnterial. It is uniYersally rerog-nized that the law will 
'liJlJll)· tl1e form of C'OJffeyance where the parties are 
,j]1•11t. T,urklear '°· Tucker, 69 Idaho 84, 203 P.2d 380, 
:;s+ (10-!0); A('corrl, Hoth v. Kahler, 74 N.W. 2d 440, 
+~>1-2 (;\.D. rn;:JG). \Vhile the courts differ as to the type 
11f d1•<.1d wltirh will be required, we have found no case 
i11 whieh a conrt h<.•ld a rontrart of sale or an option de-
fL1din· l>ecansc the form of document was not specified 
!1~· the parties. See, e.g., T7itra Seal Co. v. Jaycox, 1 N.J. 
:-:11per. :i60, G2 A.2<1 431 (Ch. Di\-. 1948) (bargain and 
·ah· tlccd ,,·ithont con•nants; Obre!J v. ('ollins, 121 ".\Iisc. 
l:P11. '.rl, :200 N.Y.~. 175, 176 (Sup. Ct. 1923) (a deed 
,. 11ir·h 1rill conyey a good title, free and rlear of en-
1·mnhrm1r<.•); Dr:1ce!J Y. Hines, 81 Kan. 834, 126 Pac. 1093 
rJ~l1:2 pn rl!l'iam) (<1Ped with the usual connants of 
1rnrra11t)·); T,rJn'Joy Y. ('011lo111be, 152 ".\fe. 385, 131 A.2d 
+.iO. +.i/ (19;)/) (rJnit claim <Iced with special connants 
11 f 11:nrant)· against enrnmhranres created by the grant-
()J'-;); Jfasfer Laboratories v. Ches1111t, 154 Neb. 749, 49 
\'.\\'. 2rl 603 (1951) ( <1eed sufficient to convey market-
ahl(' tit It•; R11ildinq !11r711strics, Ille. "· Tr right Prorlucts, 
l11r., 240 :\li1111. -173, 6~ N.W. ~cl 208 (19:>3) (\rnrranty 
d1·0rl); Petrie\". Slo1l"i11ski, 231 Wis. 478, 29 N.W. 2d 505 
1 'I.fl) ( :-;tntntor)' form of warranty deed); 92 C.J.S. 
I'rurlur & Purchaser, ~235, pp. 107-108; 55 Am.Jur. 
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Vend or and Purchaser, §§313-315, pp. 7 45-7 48; III A mrr 
ican Laic of Property, §ll.56(b), pp. llG-6. 
Where the law will supply a term in a contract, th 1 
contract will not be deficient for failure of the partiP, 
to supply the term. Lockyear Y. Tucker, supra; cf. C11111 _ 
mings Y. Nielsen, supra, 129 P.2d at 622. Because th1' 
law will supply the form of co1iY0yance to he userl if 
plaintiff exercises its option, the parties should be ell 
titled to rely upon that which the law will pro'.'id0. 
Before any lessee who also holds on option to pnr 
chase leased lands decid0s to exercise its option, it will 
han satisfied itself as to tlw d<>sirahility of the proposed 
purchase, which would at tlw nry least include satisfae-
tion with title to the lands in question. This being th 
case, it is immaterial whether the title co1iYeyed is bi-
\Ynrranty or quit claim deed. In either case, its primar) 
relianc0e would lw on its o\n1 i1iYestigation. 
It is a common practicl' i11 the mining industry to 
convey patented claims by warranty de0d and unpatentrcl 
claims hy special \Yananty dred ,d1ich warrants 01111 
against those pen;ons claiming h~', through or under 
grantor. This practice was follO\Yecl hy defendant' i1! 
their drafts of December 13, 1963. 
( c) The agrermrnt of July 23, 1963, is clear as !11 
when the option is to brgiu. Plaintiff respectfully assert, 
that, although the agreemrnt of .July 23, 1963, does no\ 
sp<>cify 011 e:ract date when tlw option commences, it i; 
nnamhiguous in pro\·idiug \Yhen, in relation to other 
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,;ds, the option was to begin. Paragraph 1 provides: 
1. TOSCO will pay $20,000 at the time of 
signing of the agreements ($10,000 to Fred V. 
and Ethel B. Larson, his wife; and 10,000 to Fred-
l'rick H. Larson and Dorothy H. Larson, his 
wife), and will receive in turn a six months' op-
tion during which ... 
The commencement date of the option became exact 
"·lil'n, on January 31, 1964, plaintiff at defendants' urg-
i11g-, paid $10,000 to Fred V. and Ethel B. Larson, his 
wife, and $10,000 to Frederick H. Larson and Dorothy H. 
Lan;on, his wife. TOSCO was as of that date entitled to 
"rcc,·iw• in turn a six-month option. n The fact that the 
partieH did not insist at that time on signing the agree-
me11t does not alter the fact that the defendants asked for 
and receiw•d the bargained for consideration to be paid 
at the commencement of the option. Thereupon, defend-
·:nts \\·ere obligated to perform. 
( rl) The provisions of the agreement of July 25, 
l~JG:i, do not violate the rule against perpetuities. Al-
thong-h this Court has not been explicit in stating which 
term violates the rnle agaiust perpetuities, such objec-
tion must he aimed at either the indefinite term of the 
1 l·a~e or the provisions granting to lessee an option to 
pnrchai;e during its term. The grant of a mineral lease 
for an indefinite term has universally been held not to 
"iolate> the rule against perpetuities. Smith v. Aggregate 
S11µply Cu., 214 Ga. 20, 102 S.E. 2d 539 (1958); 4 Ameri-
11u1 La1c nf Mi11i11g, ~16.42. 
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In the United States, an optiou to pnrcl1ns(• i11 ,, 
lease exercisable during the tenant's term is Yalid ri· 
gardll'ss of the length of thC' lPasP. (i A111erica11 /,011 ,, 1 
Property, ~24.::i/; 4 RPstnt<>mP11t, Prop<>rt>· (1~J44), '.;:9.-1 
( 3) E 1·e11 if the ag rcem e11 t of J ,,/ !J 2:i, rnr1:1, 
i11 its origi11al form 111i_qltf be heir/ lo /1, 
deficient in material frrms, those fr1111.• 
hul'e bee11 s11p11lied by the drafts 11rrpari1/ 
by crmnscl for defe11da11ts as co11te111pluteil 
by the a,qrceme11t . 
E,·pn if this Court concludes that the ngTPenwnt 11[ 
July 25, 1963, is vague and m1certai11 as to certaiu 1enn,_ 
thPrf' can he no (pwstion as to thC' partiPs' int<>qn·datio11 
of those tl•rms. The comments of Defendant Lnrso11 awl 
his connsPl, Dufford, cited on pages 12 and 1~. supru, 
refute any contention hy the clefemlants that thP parti1" 
ha(l failed to agree 011 essential tC'rms. 'l'l1e>· harl 1111 
problem in preparing their drafts hC'canse of yai;ur111"'' 
or u11certainty. These drafts, llatell Decemlwr 1:1, 106::. 
which were prepared without furtlH•r consultation \l'ith 
plaintiff or its age11ts, represent def0nclants' ow11 intvr-
pretation of the terms in questio11. 'l'hese e011stnwtio11.-
hy the parties themseh-es are C'utitlecl to grPat, if 11111 
coutrolling, influ0nce. .l<'nki11s Y. Je11sc11, :2--1- Utnli JOS. 
GG Pac. 773, 779 (1901); C11111111iJ1qs Y. J/irlstafes (!ii 
Corp., 103 :!\Iiss. 678, 9 Ro. 2cl 648 (1942); Earp. Y. Jfi11 
Continent Petroleum Corp., 167 Okla. 86, 27 P.2d 8:i:i. 
864-866 (1933); 17 Am . .Jnr., (2/4. The trial court fo1111il 
that the parties consiclPrC'd themseh·es i11 agreement a11il 
acted accordingly. (Record, p. 92) 
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Jl. THIS <10l1RT IL\S NOT DECIDED THE 
SOLE QUESTION ON APPEAL WHICH 
JS "WHETHER AN UXA~IBIGUOUS OP-
T10N CONTRACT C"\N BE VARIED BY 
P"\ROL EVIDENCE. 
This ('on rt has uot deeiclecl the question raised by 
11 11. 1ri;d1·1nll't 's amended jmlgmellt and plaintiff's appeal 
1J 11 .1cfn>m. That question is the basis of this appeal and 
1l1e ollly one ,,·hich this Court ean properly eonsider. See, 
,) .\m .. Tm.~f1 AJJJJeal a11rl Error, ·s~723-725, pp. 116-169. 
Sincl' tlefell<lants cannot properly object, this Court 
,J1ould affirm the final judgment of the trial court insofar 
11, it fon1111 that the parties had entered into a hinding 
· 11p1 ion ront ract. This Court can then focus upon the cen-
tral que:;tion upon whif'h this case was tried and ap-
111·:1bl: Could the parties hy oral agreements vary the 
1"qm·ss provisions of the .J nly 25 agreement to provide 
'"·1 th(' t·omm011cemcnt of the six-month option period 
1.i1.Ju!~- 13, 1963 ~This question is disposed of in favor of 
plaintiff hy the parol edclence rnle, thC' doctrine of mer-
'i'l'l' and the statute of frauds heretofore exhaustively 
hi1·frd hy lioth plaintiff ancl llefC'nclants in this appeal. 
Se!' Appellm1t's Brief, pp. 30-37, .\ppellant's Reply 
Brief, pp. HJ, 20. 
UT. SU.'.\E\JARY. 
'!'his ( 1ourt erred in hasing its decision 011 findings 
111111 rnuclnsions ·which lrn(l been vocated hy the trial court 
:111d di<1 so 011 the nrgi11g of defendants. Since defendants 
Ii;-· plenr1i11gs, evidence and findings and conclusions have 
:idr1ptl>d !lie position that there is a valid binding option 
(·11 11trnc-t, th0y are vreclnded from denying the hinding 
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nature of that option cont rad in this Court h,,. the do(•. 
trim' of "invited error" and hecaus(' the~· failPd to ero%. 
appeal from the trial court's jmlgml'nt in whole or in 
part. 
The trial court was coned in firn1iug that ti1Pre 1rai 
a binding option c011traet, a position "·hich dc.fc'JHiant 
cannot here contest. 
The sole question rema1111ng for decision herr is 
whether the unambiguous agrePmr>nt of .J nly 2:i, 19G3. 
can he Yaried h>- parol e\·idPnce, a question m1s11·rred by 
the doctrine of mC'rgC'r, thl' parol eYi(lence rule and the 
Statute of Frauds. 
For the foregoing reasons we rcs1wctfully reque~t 
the Court to grant a rehearing in this ease and rero11sider 
its deeisio11. \Ye rpquPst that thr judgnwnt .of the Dis-
triet Court he affirmed insofar as it hPld that there was 
a hirnli11g option agrcempnt hPh\'l'ell the partiPs mid the 
judgment he rrYerscd imwfar as it hPld that the option 
period Pxpired. \Ve rPquest that jmlgment ]Jc cutt>red 
for tlie plaintiff granting it a six-month option to lease 
in accordance "·ith Exhibits "A" and "B '' to Appel-
lant's Brief on appeal or, that the mntter he remanded 
to tlw District C(Jurt for a uew trial. 
Respectfnll>· submitted, 
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